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Gender Inequality in Deliberative Participation
CHRISTOPHER F. KARPOWITZ Brigham Young University
TALI MENDELBERG Princeton University
LEE SHAKER Portland State University
Canmen and women have equal levels of voice and authority in deliberation or does deliberationexacerbate gender inequality?Does increasing women’s descriptive representation in deliberationincrease their voice and authority? We answer these questions and move beyond the debate by
hypothesizing that the group’s gender composition interacts with its decision rule to exacerbate or erase
the inequalities. We test this hypothesis and various alternatives, using experimental data with many
groups and links between individuals’ attitudes and speech. We find a substantial gender gap in voice and
authority, but as hypothesized, it disappears under unanimous rule and few women, or under majority
rule and many women. Deliberative design can avoid inequality by fitting institutional procedure to the
social context of the situation.
For some time now, normative theorists haveurged more deliberation to enhance democracy(e.g., Chambers 1996; Fishkin 1995; Gutmann
and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1989; 1996). One of
their key requirements is equal participation and au-
thority in discussion. Ideally, then, deliberation will
“diminish the discriminatory effects of class, race, and
gender inequalities” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004,
48, 50), and unequal power in society will “not shape
[deliberators’] chances to contribute to deliberation,
nor . . . play an authoritative role in their deliber-
ation” (Cohen 1989, 74). Critics counter that delib-
erators will not achieve equal voice; groups—such as
women—with less authority in society will speak less
and consequently carry less authority in deliberation
(Fraser 1992;Mansbridge 1983; Sanders 1997;Williams
2000; Young 1996; 2001).
In response to this concern, numerous attempts are
being made to facilitate equal voice for women by
increasing their numbers in deliberating bodies. The
U.S. National Health Planning and Resources Devel-
opment Act, for example, requires citizens serving on
boards to be “broadly representative” of social identi-
ties (Mansbridge 1999, 634). Some states mandate gen-
der balance on appointed committees (Hannagan and
Larimer 2011). The European Union, United Nations,
Organization of American States, and the African
Union have declared that member states should adopt
30%minimumquotas for women in all political bodies,
and more than one hundred countries have done so
(Krook 2009).
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We investigate whether the critics are correct in ar-
guing that women speak less thanmen during delibera-
tion and thus have less perceived influence. Moreover,
we ask whether increasing descriptive representation –
that is, the proportion of women in the group—raises
women’s deliberative voice (speech participation) and
authority (perceived influence). We provide the first
rigorous test of these claims using a large dataset of
deliberating groups randomly assigned to treatments,
and linking individuals’ speech with pre- and post-
deliberation preferences and attitudes. Moreover, we
develop and find support for our own hypothesis:
Numbers can remedy inequality, but do so in inter-
action with the group’s decision rule.1 Rules determine
whether women benefit from larger numbers and can
help women even when they are few. Inequality disap-
pears with unanimous rule and fewwomen, ormajority
rule and many women.
“Chattiness” may be a randomly distributed person-
ality dimension, but when speaking is the mechanism
for deciding political matters, gender differences in
speech participation are a relevant marker of social
and political inequality. As Sanders (1997) writes, “If
it’s demonstrable that some kinds of people routinely
speak more than others in deliberative settings, as it
is, then participation isn’t equal, and one democratic
standard has fallen” (365).2 Deliberative design may
thus need to concern itself both with the equal oppor-
tunity to speak and with the equal use of that oppor-
tunity, much as democracies consider both the formal
1 We study gender inequality because gender is a dimension of polit-
ical under-representation both historically and currently. As Burns,
Schlozman, and Verba (2001) note, politics is still widely viewed as a
“man’s game,” and there are continued gender gaps in participation
and representation.
2 Thompson (2008, 501, 506) agrees: “[T]he discussion is better de-
liberation to the extent that the participation is equally distributed,”
and “most [theorists] agree that the more the deliberation is influ-
enced by unequal economic resources and social status, the more
deficient it is.” Sunstein (2002, 155) concurs: “[I]n some deliberative
processes, members of lower status groups speak less and are given
less respectful attention. If people are not heard, and if they do not
speak, both democracy and deliberation are at risk. And if members
of certain groups receive less respectful attention, both liberty and
equality are at risk.”
533
Gender Inequality in Deliberative Participation August 2012
right to political participation and social inequalities
in who actually participates (Burns, Schlozman, and
Verba 2001, 6). Systematic analysis of deliberators’ be-
havior is almost nonexistent.3 Yet, as several theorists
argue, speaking is a crucial type of political act in a
democracy, and all the more so in deliberative settings
(Mansbridge 1983). Specifically, if less speech leads to
less authority within the group, as the critics contend,
then inequalities in speech participation may translate
into inequalities in deliberative influence and author-
ity. Therefore, we need to look inside the black box of
deliberation by examining the volume of voice and the
patterns of silence.
Rather than focusing our attention on whose pref-
erences win, we examine speech participation and per-
ceived influence as forms of symbolic authority that
reflect and reinforce the broad civic capacity of a dis-
advantaged social group (Kathlene 1994, 560). We do
so to address the rationales of advocates and critics of
deliberation, which have less to do with whose prefer-
ences are implemented than with deliberation’s poten-
tial to enlarge or undermine democratic and republican
civic capacities (Fishkin 1995; Gastil et al. 2008; see
also Pateman 1970). This approach also follows stud-
ies of women’s political participation such as Burns,
Schlozman, and Verba (2001, 6), which treat political
participation as a form of symbolic authority and civic
standing.
EFFECTS OF GENDER COMPOSITION
The literature on gender composition offers the hy-
pothesis that the lower the number of women in a
group, the less that women participate in and influence
it, and the bigger the gender gap is in participation and
influence.4 We call this the “gender role” hypothesis.
Previous work offers three reasons for this hypothesis.
First, being in a numerical minority lowers the status
of women in the group and thus their participation and
authority in group discussion. For example, Johnson
and Schulman (1989) found that women’s influence is
rated lower when they are in a numerical minority and
that the effect of numerical minority status is greater
on women than on men. This effect comes from status,
which gives people a sense of entitlement to take and
keep the floor; talking more leads, in turn, to more
perceived influence (Fiske 2010). The fewer women
in the group, the lower their status, the less they may
speak, and the lower their influence. The expectation,
then, is that the gender gap will shrink as the number
of women increases.
Second, the disadvantage women face might be es-
pecially powerful in discussions of political issues. Men
3 See Bryan (2004); for qualitative analyses, see Rosenberg (2007)
and Cramer Walsh (2007); see Grunenfelder and Baechtiger (2007)
for legislatures.
4 Individual-level differences across genders are often small and in-
consistent in comparison to large variances within gender (Aries
1998; Sapiro 2003). However, these differences can become large
and consequential when amplified by group-level or institutional
forces (Sapiro 2003).
tend to be perceived as more competent and to enjoy
a higher status than women in discussions of what are
perceived as masculine subjects (Ridgeway and Smith-
Lovin 1999). As Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001)
suggest, politics has long been viewed as a masculine
arena, and in politics, women are less likely than men
to express opinions or attempt to persuade others,
even controlling on level of information (Hansen 1997;
Rapoport 1981). A variety of studies thus lead us to
expect that, when women discuss political issues with
men, they will defer to the assumed expertise and dis-
played confidence ofmen (Aries 1998; Bowers, Steiner,
and Sandys 2001; Croson andGneezy 2009; Eagly 1987;
Giles et al. 1987; Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington 1983;
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Ridgeway 1982; Strodt-
beck, James, and Hawkins 1957). Therefore, when pol-
itics is the topic for deliberation, we might expect a
gender gap in participation and authority in groups
where women are aminority–where there are more ac-
tive, confident (male) participants to whom the women
defer (Aries 1998; Johnson 1994; Piliavin and Martin
1978; Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989). This is the second
rationale for the hypothesis that women speak and in-
fluence less than men as their numbers decrease.
Third, women may speak less when there are fewer
women because gendered norms of interaction vary
with gender composition and facilitate or hinder
women’s participation. The notion is that girls and
boys are socialized to different gendered cultures of
interaction, and they carry these implicit scripts of be-
havior with them into adulthood (Maltz and Borker
1982; Tannen 1990). In settings with many men, the
interaction tends to take on more stereotypically mas-
culine characteristics of individual assertion, agency,
competition, and dominance; in contrast, in settings
with many women, people tend to interact in a more
stereotypically feminine style that emphasizes coop-
eration, intimacy, and the inclusion of all participants
(Aries 1976; Dindia andAllen 1992; Ellis 1982; McCar-
rick, Manderscheid, and Silbergeld 1981; Miller 1985;
Smith-Lovin and Brody 1989; see Mendelberg and
Karpowitz 2007). Therefore women may experience
a greater sense of confidence in predominantly female
settings with their stereotypically feminine norms of in-
teraction, and more discomfort in predominantly male
settings with their more masculine norms of interac-
tion. For example, Kathlene (1994) found that pre-
dominantly male legislative committees in Colorado
feature competitive, aggressive communication behav-
ior that inhibits women’s participation more than it
does men’s. In sum, this literature again suggests that
women will participate less thanmen in predominantly
male groups and will increase their participation and
influence as their proportion increases.
The existing literature thus offers three distinct ra-
tionales, all of which converge on the same prediction:
In mixed-gender discussions, women will speak less
and be less influential than men. These disadvantages
will increase as the group gender composition skews
toward males.
The gender role hypothesis implies that effects will
be especially pronounced when the gender imbalance
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in deliberating groups is extreme. For example, existing
work finds that women are especially disadvantaged
when they are the lone female member of their group
(Craig and Sherif 1986; Johnson and Schulman 1989).
Men, however, do not suffer the same disadvantage
when they are the gender “token.”5 Therefore, token
women’s participation and authority will be lower than
that of token men.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the gender
role hypothesis leads to the expectation that women
will flourish in all-female settings. Because women are
disadvantaged in political discussions with men, they
may do best without any interactionwithmen, andmay
benefit most from their own discussion spaces or “en-
claves” (Karpowitz, Raphael, and Hammond 2009).
Women in enclaves are more likely than women in
mixedgroups to initiate interaction and tobe addressed
(Aries 1976, 15; Carlock and Martin 1977; Reskin,
McBrier, and Kmec 1999, 346). All-female groups
elevate women’s participation in politics (Burns,
Schlozman, andVerba 2001, 230; Crowder-Meyer 2010;
Skocpol 1992).AsBurns, Schlozman, andVerba (2001)
summarize, “organizations of women provide . . . op-
portunities for leadership, facilitating the exercise of
voice in organizational matters and the development
of civic skills” (230). In general, then, the gender role
hypothesis leads us to expect that groups composed ex-
clusively of womenwill increase women’s participation
and influence.
IMPORTANCE OF THE DECISION RULE
The gender role hypothesis dominates the literature on
gender and discussion, but we view that hypothesis as
incomplete. The proportion of women in a group is not
theonly important factor that affects genderedpatterns
of speech participation. Institutions can eliminate the
disadvantages of low numbers; similarly, they can block
the power of high numbers. Specifically, we focus on the
group’s decision rule.
We focus on decision rules because previous work
suggests that unanimous rule can create group norms
that enhance consensus and inclusion. Because the mi-
nority rarely persuades the majority in small groups
(Moscovici 1980; 1985), a rule that includes minorities
can substantially alter group dynamics. A seminal ex-
perimental study of mock juries reports that people
shift their views during discussion more under unani-
mous thanmajority rule (Hastie, Penrod, and Penning-
ton 1983). Unanimous rule can increase a sense that
the decision was legitimate and appropriate (Kameda
1991; Kaplan and Miller 1987; Nemeth 1977). Group
5 But see Kanter (1977a; 1977b), who argues that extreme minor-
ity status affects men and women similarly because it emphasizes
the salience of the individual’s gender, leading to more negative
stereotypical judgments. Others argue that men aremore negatively
affected than women by numerical minority status because they are
less familiar with it (Chatman and O’Reilly 2004; van Knippenberg
and Schippers 2007).
consensus generated through talk can lead to increased
cooperative behavior (Bouas and Komorita 1996), and
unanimous rule leads to a full sharing of informa-
tion by deliberators (Mathis 2011). Thus, unanimous
rule leads to consensus-oriented norms of inclusion
that protect numerical minorities (see also Mendel-
berg 2002). However, no one has considered whether
this protective effect for preference minorities holds
for social identity minorities. The question we pose is
whether unanimous rule helps women.
We theorize that unanimous rule protects gendermi-
norities just as it protects preferenceminorities because
of the emphasis it places on inclusion and cooperation
(Bouas and Komorita 1996; Mathis 2011). As studies
reviewed earlier show, the norm that unanimous rule
creates is the expectation that everyone should be in-
cluded in the decision-making process. As Mansbridge
(1983) explains, “a consensual rule can actually cre-
ate unity” (256). This rule helps minorities by elevat-
ing their level of participation. Although unanimous
rule may also pressure minorities to go along with
the group’s central tendency at the end of the day
(see Devine et al. 2001, and Mendelberg 2002), never-
theless, unanimous rule produces the expectation that
each voice should be heard. It signals that the group
should orient to its members’ commonalities and that
decisions should be based on equal respect (Mans-
bridge 1983, 14). Under unanimity, no voice can be
overlooked because every vote is pivotal. Conversely,
majority rule signals that conflict is acceptable and that
some perspectives may not be included in the group’s
final decision. Majority rule sets a norm whereby de-
cisions are based on a contest over dominance. With
this norm, majorities are unlikely to emphasize inclu-
siveness, and minorities are unlikely to assume that
their voices matter and that they should speak. Under
majority rule the power of numbers matters most, and
minorities are ultimately at a disadvantage.
We theorize, then, that decision rule and gender
composition will interact to shape patterns of partic-
ipation and influence within the group. Our interac-
tion hypothesis rests on the claim that unanimous rule
produces a group dynamic in which various types of
numerical minorities—social identity as well as pref-
erence minorities—are included more than they would
be otherwise (Bouas andKomorita 1996;Mathis 2011).
Compared to majority rule, unanimous rule benefits
both genders when they are in the numerical minority
of the group. However, the effects of unanimity are
best understood in contrast to the speech participation
of each gender minority under majority rule. Minority
women will be included more under unanimous than
majority rule, and this will decrease the gender gap.Mi-
noritymenwill also be includedmoreunder unanimous
than under majority rule, but this will enhance rather
than close the gender gap. The effect of unanimity will
be roughly equal for both genders, but womenwill shift
from under-representation to equality, whereas men
will shift from equality to over-participation.
One possible explanation for why the equal effect
produces different gender gaps is that each gender
minority increases its participation under unanimous
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rule for a different reason. As noted earlier, in
small group discussion, on average men tend toward
individual agency, women toward cooperation (Miller
1985; Smith-Lovin andBrody 1989). Therefore, women
in a numerical minority may interpret unanimous rule
to mean that they should make at least a minimal
contribution, more than they do in majority rule, but
avoid dominating the discussion. Minority men may
interpret unanimous rule as a signal that they should
maximize their individual participation. Consequently,
men may view minority status as requiring maximum
individual input from the minority and act on this view
when they are the minority under unanimous rule. In
sum, relative to majority rule, unanimous rule elevates
the participation of both gender minorities, men and
women, equally. By extension, then, unanimous rule
helps female tokens, closing the gender gap in those
groups, but it also helps male tokens, exacerbating the
gender gap in their groups.
Our attention to the interaction of gender compo-
sition and decision rule thus significantly qualifies the
gender role hypothesis. Women should increase their
participation with greater numbers only under major-
ity rule; under unanimous rule, greater numbers do not
benefit women, because although this rule helpsminor-
ity women, it also aids minority men to the detriment
of majority women. Formally stated, our interaction
hypothesis is that a significant interaction between gen-
der composition and decision rule exists: The gender
gap in speech and influence favoring men decreases as
the number of women increases under majority rule;
the gender gap in speech and influence favoring men
increases as the number of women increases under
unanimous rule.
No interactive effect of decision rule and gender has
been taken into consideration in the literatures on gen-
der or decision rule. Yet an interaction is plausible in
light of what we know about each variable in isolation.
Attention to this interaction represents our theoretical
contribution to these literatures.
DATA, DESIGN, AND METHOD
We designed our study to generate a sufficient num-
ber of groups in various gender compositions to create
adequate variance in that independent variable; to test
for the predicted interactive effects of gender compo-
sition with decision rule; to use random assignment
to create exogenous gender composition and decision
rule variables so as to gauge their unbiased effects; and
to measure the level of speech participation of indi-
viduals and match it to their individual characteristics,
including their gender. Extensive detail on the pro-
cedure, subjects, item wordings and responses, coding,
descriptive statistics, and othermethodologicalmatters
is in the supplemental Online Appendix (available at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2012012).
We use a 6 × 2 between-subjects experimental de-
sign, randomly assigning individuals to one of six gen-
der compositions (that is, to a group that ranged from
0 to 5 women) and to one of two decision rule condi-
tions: unanimous rule or majority rule.6 We stratified
by gender to avoid a balanced gender mix in most
groups. Gender composition was randomly assigned
to dates on the schedule of experimental sessions, and
subjects who signed up to attend on that date were
assigned to the corresponding gender composition con-
dition. This ensured that group types did not cluster
on particular days of the week and that participants
had a roughly equal probability of being assigned to
each group type. Thus, each man or woman had the
same probability of being assigned to a given gender
composition. This satisfies the random assignment as-
sumption, which is not that each treatment is equally
likely to be assigned to a given person, but rather
that each person is equally likely to be assigned to a
treatment (Morton and Williams 2010). We recruited
more than five participants for each session, and the
alternates helped ensure that we could fill the day’s
assigned type of gender composition. Randomization
of decision rule was achieved by the roll of dice prior
to each session. Randomization checks and propensity
score analyses indicate that individuals were assigned
by a random process and groups were equivalent on
relevant covariates.7
Between August 2007 and February 2009, we re-
cruited students and community members and ran-
domly assigned them to one of the conditions. Our
method followed the basic procedure of a study by
Frohlich and colleagues (Frohlich and Oppenheimer
1990; 1992; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey 1987).
We told participants that later in the experiment they
would be doing work tasks to earn money and that the
amount of money each individual took home would be
based on their performance on the work tasks and the
group’s decision about how to redistribute any money
earned by group members. Prior to group deliberation
they were not told the nature of the work.8
After participants privately filled out a pretreatment
questionnaire, they were brought together as a group,
where they were instructed to conduct a “full and open
discussion” and to choose the “most just” principle of
redistribution. Following Frohlich and Oppenheimer
(1992), we instructed participants to make a collec-
tive decision that would apply not only concretely and
immediately to themselves and their group but also hy-
pothetically to society at large, so we could generalize
beyond the lab situation to the decisions people make
6 Because experimental sessions were run over an extended period
of time, there is no correlation between gender composition type and
the day of theweekor the timeof the session. Typically, we conducted
one experimental session at each site per day, and sessions started at
similar times of the day. If fewer than five participants showed up,
the session was canceled and participants could sign up for subse-
quent sessions. See the supplemental Online Appendix (available at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2012012) for details.
7 Demographics such as education, income, age, partisanship, and
student status had no significant relationship with gender composi-
tion and rule. We performed three tests on each set of propensity
scores: a two-sample t-test, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
8 In the Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) study, this was meant to
simulate the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, designed to prompt people
to consider principles of justice.
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TABLE 1. Average Individual Proportion Talk by Gender and
Experimental Condition
Unanimous Majority
Gender Composition Group N Men Women
Gender
Gap Group N Men Women
Gender
Gap
0 females 8 .200 — 7 .200 —
1 female 10 .205 .179 .026 9 .218 .130 .088∗∗∗
2 females 6 .216 .176 .040 7 .222 .166 .056∗∗
3 females 9 .240 .173 .067∗∗ 7 .255 .163 .092∗∗∗
4 females 8 .289 .178 .111∗∗ 8 .183 .204 −.021
5 females 7 — .200 8 — .200
Total # of groups 48 46
Total # of individuals — 124 116 — 114 116
Note: Gender gap is the average male Proportion Talk minus average female Proportion Talk in each condition.
Positive numbers indicate male advantage. Asterisks indicate gender gaps significantly different from 0. ∗∗∗ p <
.01; ∗∗ p < .05; ∗ p < .10; one-tailed unpaired difference of means test, group-level analysis.
about redistribution in politics. The only requirement
was that they deliberate for at least five minutes before
making a collective decision about the redistribution of
income earned during the experiment. All instructions
were exactly the same across conditions.9 Voting on
rules for the distribution of income occurred by secret
ballot, with the decision based on either unanimous or
majority rule. Every group included five participants.
Participants appeared to take their deliberations se-
riously. On average, the groups spent just over 25 min-
utes (SD = 11) in discussion, and some discussions
lasted for more than an hour. Consistent with the in-
structions, group discussions nearly always explored
how their choices about redistributionwouldwork out-
side the experimental setting. The discussions touched
on meaningful topics related to the redistribution, in-
cluding the nature of equality, the needs of the poor,
the importance of incentivizing work, the possibility
of economic mobility, the fairness of various systems
of taxation, and the value of charity. Before deliberat-
ing, participants were given information about several
well-known principles of redistribution, including no
redistribution at all (everyone keeps what they earn),
various poverty thresholds (minimum incomes below
which no one would be allowed to fall), or equal re-
distribution of all income earned by the group (every
group member receives the same amount, regardless
of performance). These different principles and their
implications formed the basis for much of the group
discussion. During deliberation, each participant was
recorded on a separate audio track, and the full con-
versation was also recorded on a master track that
included all participants.10 A sample transcript is in
the supplemental Online Appendix.
After the group deliberation and decision, partici-
pants were asked to indicate (privately) the most in-
9 Assistants read the instructions, but then sat apart from the group
and did not actively moderate its discussion.
10 Our software measures the participation of each member pre-
cisely; see the supplemental Online Appendix for further details.
fluential person in the group. Participants then per-
formed several rounds of “work”—correcting as many
spelling errors in a block of difficult text as they
could find within a two-minute time limit (replicating
Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s [1992] choice of proce-
dure). Participants earned money according to their
performance, and these earnings were distributed to
group members according to their chosen distribution
scheme. At the end of the work period, participants
responded to a series of questions on attitudes and
beliefs and were debriefed.
Our experiment included 470 individuals in 94
groups. Table 1 summarizes our experimental condi-
tions and the number of participants in each. Although
our statistical power was somewhat limited, our re-
search design includes a much larger sample of groups
than is typical in group research.
CONTROLS FOR
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The experiment was conducted at two different sites—a
small town on the mid-Atlantic coast and a medium-
sized city in the Mountain West. In the regressions we
control on site because subjects were assigned ran-
domly within but not across sites. As is common in
controlled experiments, our goal was not a nationally
representative sample but one with sufficient variance,
and the sample did vary on relevant characteristics
such as SES and political attitudes (see Table A1 in
the supplemental Online Appendix). Because individ-
ual race and group racial composition would introduce
powerful interactions with our explanatory variables,
thereby requiring a much larger number of groups, we
recruited white non-Hispanic subjects only.
It is possible that gender differences are spuriously
caused by preferences or attitudes correlated with indi-
vidual gender.Our experiment focused on deliberation
about redistribution, so preferences over the principles
of redistribution or attitudes about egalitarianism are
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relevant. Controlling for these preferences is important
because they are correlated with gender (Crowder-
Meyer 2007; Shapiro andMahajan 1986). Another pos-
sibility is that women are quiet not because of gender
disadvantage or gendered communication, but because
others are articulating their preferences. If one’s prefer-
ences are already voiced, efficiency dictates that there
is no need to waste time or effort on repetition. This
would happen if women aremembers of the preference
majority in the group, so the discussion would likely
proceed in their preferred direction. To address this
possibility, in our individual-level analyses we also con-
trol for the match between the individual’s preference
and the majority’s pre-deliberation preference.
RESULTS I: SPEECH PARTICIPATION
Advocates argue that well-constructed deliberations
“create an environment in which [gender or class] in-
equalities in the broader society do not distort the de-
liberative process” (Fishkin et al. 2010, 8–9). Critics
argue that deliberation entails the “the systematic dis-
regard of ascriptively defined groups such as women”
(Sanders 1997, 353). Which claim is more accurate?
Specifically, does deliberation produce gender equality
or inequality? To answer these questions, we divide
the number of seconds each individual spoke by the
group’s total number of seconds. This is an individual’s
Proportion Talk (scaled 0–1), and it allows contrasts
across groups with varying discussion lengths.11 Table
1 shows, for each condition, the average male Propor-
tion Talk, the average female Proportion Talk, and the
difference between them (with associated group-level
t-tests).12 If men andwomen participated at equal rates
in a five-person group, the average individual Propor-
tionTalk for each genderwould be 0.20 (in otherwords,
the average male and the average female would each
take 20% of the conversation), resulting in a gender
gap of 0. But in five of the eight conditions, the t-test in-
dicates a statistically significant gender gap (always fa-
voringmen), partially confirming the critics’ worries. In
Figure 1, the ratios of female-to-male Proportion Talk
in each condition show the magnitude more clearly. In
most of the conditions, women’s participation is under
75% of that of men; in three of the eight conditions it
is less than two-thirds of men’s participation. The crit-
ics of deliberation have cause for concern—women of-
ten participate less than men, sometimes substantially
so.
Yet these results also show that the inequality varies
with the group’s decision rule and gender composi-
tion, in a pattern more consistent with the interaction
hypothesis than with the gender role hypothesis. The
gender role hypothesis predicts equality in the four
11 Descriptive statistics for this and other variables are in the sup-
plemental Online Appendix, Table A2.
12 Because our hypotheses offer clear directional expectations (in-
equalities of speech participation will favor men), we employ a one-
tailed test of significance.
FIGURE 1. Ratio of Female-to-Male Speech
Participation by Experimental Condition
Note: A ratio of 1 means equality of speech participation.
conditions in which women are a majority and inequal-
ity in the four conditions where they are a minority.
Table 1 shows that only three of these eight predictions
are confirmed. But Table 1 confirms seven of the eight
predictions of the interaction hypothesis: Under ma-
jority rule, there is a large and significant gender gap
in the one- and two-female conditions, but not in the
four-female condition; under unanimous rule, we see
the reverse: a large and significant gender gap in the
three- or four-female conditions but not in the one- and
two-female conditions. Unanimous rule helps minority
women, and larger numbers help women only under
majority rule. The gender role hypothesis neither an-
ticipates the contingent effect of gender composition
nor the protective effect of unanimous rule, whereas
the interaction hypothesis predicts both.
A small anomaly is the disconfirmation of one of
the eight predictions of the interaction hypothesis: Un-
der majority rule, women under-participate men in the
three-female groups. Our interaction hypothesis does
not predict an exact functional form for the relationship
between gender composition and speech participation,
leaving open the possibility that women’s disadvantage
is sufficiently powerful that it requires a supermajority
to overcome. It is also quite possible that the result
for the three-female groups is simply noise. We are
reassured that the movement toward equality in the
four-female groups is large and statistically meaning-
ful. In our view, the unexpected result for the three-
female groups qualifies, but does not undermine, our
interaction hypothesis.
Having shown a pervasive but contingent gender
gap, we directly test the competing predictions from
the gender role and interaction hypotheses about what
increases or decreases the gap, using ordinary least
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TABLE 2. Determinants of the Gender Gap in Speech Participation
(Group-level Analysis)
(1) (2)
Variables
Gender Gap in Speech
Participation (Interaction)
Gender Gap in Speech
Participation
(Interaction + Controls)
Unanimous −0.174∗∗ −0.190∗∗
(0.078) (0.081)
Number of Women −0.041∗∗ −0.050∗∗
(0.021) (0.023)
Unanimous∗Number of Women 0.069∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.030)
# of Egalitarians 0.011
(0.018)
# Favoring Maximum Redistribution 0.012
(0.027)
# Favoring No Redistribution −0.006
(0.025)
Constant 0.171∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.071)
Observations 64 64
R-squared 0.144 0.160
Control for outlier Yes Yes
Control for experimental location Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1; one-tailed test.
squares (OLS) with group-level data (see Table 2).13
The dependent variable is the Gender Gap in Speech
Participation (scaled −1 to 1), which is the difference
between the group’s average male and average female
Proportion Talk. Model 1 confirms the interaction hy-
pothesis: The coefficient on the number of women and
the interaction term of number of women and unan-
imous rule are both in the expected direction, statis-
tically significant, and substantively large. As the in-
teraction hypothesis predicts, only under majority rule
does the gender gap shrink as the number of women in-
creases (evidenced by the negative and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient forNumber of Women); the reverse
effect is obtained under unanimous rule (indicated by
the positive and significant coefficient for the interac-
tion between the number of women and unanimous
rule). These interactive effects are not anticipated by
the gender role hypothesis.
Model 2 in Table 2 also controls for alternative ex-
planations by including three variables measured be-
fore deliberation: the number of group members who
scored above the scale midpoint (nearly identical to
the mean) on general egalitarianism, the number who
favored no redistribution, and the numberwho favored
very high levels of redistribution from rich to poor (see
Table A2 in the supplemental Online Appendix for
13 Regressions also include a control for one outlier group in the
1-female, majority rule condition. This outlier is well over 2 standard
deviations away from all other groups in that condition (as well as
all groups in the experiment). We follow Choi (2009) and control
for the outlier, rather than discard it. The key interaction terms are
statistically significant regardless of the presence of this control or
the control for experimental location.
details of all measures). Even with these control vari-
ables, the effect of the interaction between decision
rule and gender composition is strong and statistically
significant, confirming our interaction hypothesis.14
Table 3 shows an individual-level test of our hy-
potheses that allows us to apply additional controls.
If women speak less regarding redistribution because
they have more generous attitudes about redistribu-
tion, then what appear to be gender differences may
be due to differences in these attitudes instead. There-
fore, we include a measure of the individual’s pre-
deliberation level of egalitarianism. We also test the
notion that women may speak less when they are sat-
isfied with the direction of discussion not because of
the group’s gender composition and decision rule, but
because they are part of the group’s pre-deliberation
preference majority. We thus include a dummy vari-
able tapping whether the individual’s pre-deliberation
preferences about redistribution matched the group’s
pre-deliberation majority preference. We use OLS re-
gression with cluster robust standard errors because
individuals are nested within groups. The dependent
variable is individual Proportion Talk (scaled 0–1).
With or without controls, the results in Table 3 con-
firm the interaction hypothesis. Under majority rule,
14 Alternative measures of group preferences, including measures of
the gender gaps in pre-deliberation egalitarianism and in preferences
for redistribution, produce similar results. We find no relationship
between gender composition and the gender gap in pre-deliberation
egalitarianism under either rule. In addition, alternative model spec-
ifications, such as those in which the controls are interacted with
the decision rule, do not change the large and significant interaction
between decision rule and gender composition.
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TABLE 3. Determinants of Speech
Participation (Individual-level Analysis)
(1) (2)
Variables
Proportion
Talk
Proportion
Talk with
Controls
Female −0.083∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027)
Unanimous −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Female∗Unanimous 0.050 0.051∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Number of Women 0.006 0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Female∗Number of Women 0.011∗ 0.011∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Unanimous∗Number of Women 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010)
Female∗Unanimous∗Number of −0.021∗∗ −0.022∗∗
Women (0.012) (0.012)
Egalitarianism −0.007
(0.031)
Match Group’s Pre-deliberation 0.009
Preference (0.009)
Constant 0.207∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.014)
Observations 470 470
R-squared 0.043 0.045
Control for outlier Yes Yes
Control for experimental
location
Yes Yes
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01;
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1; one-tailed test.
women talk more, relative to men, as the number of
women increases (see the positive interaction term
Female∗Number of Women). However, under unan-
imous rule, women talk less than men as the num-
ber of women increases (the negative coefficient on
Female∗Unanimous∗Number of Women). The controls
for the participants’ pre-deliberation preferences are
not significant. This evidence thus undermines the al-
ternative explanations that women are speaking less
than men because (1) they have different preferences
than men or (2) they do not bother to speak because
others already articulate their ideas, asmay occur when
they are the preference majority. The gender gap is
due to the different responses of women and men to
the gendered dynamics in the group, as the interaction
hypothesis argues.15
Table 4 contains fourmodels that relate to the speech
participation of gender tokens. Recall that the gender
role hypothesis predicts that women will be especially
disadvantaged when they are an extreme minority.
15 As a robustness check, we replicated the results with an alterna-
tive measure of deliberative participation, Percent Speaking Turns
(supplemental Online Appendix, Figure A1).
However, our interaction hypothesis suggests that fe-
male tokens will be helped by unanimous rule and that
so will male tokens. The analysis in Table 4 compares
the participation of token women to the participation
of token men. In other words, it directly compares the
behavior of men and women when they are in similar
conditions.
In all models in Table 4, the Female term is nega-
tive, suggesting that female tokens talk less than male
tokens. This finding supports the gender role hypoth-
esis. However, Model 3 shows that the gender role
hypothesis is only part of the story. Consistent with
the interaction hypothesis, token males and females
each perform better under unanimous rule than under
majority rule (the positive, significant coefficient on
the Unanimous term).16 The difference-in-differences
in the effect of unanimous rule on the two gender to-
kens, represented by the interaction term in Model 4,
is not statistically significant: The effect of unanimity
is essentially the same for men and women. This equal
effect, combined with unequal starting points under
majority rule, means that unanimous rule elevates the
token male above his female group members while it
equalizes the token female with her male group mem-
bers.As the interaction hypothesis predicts, unanimous
rule helps minority women but hurts majority women.
This explains why, under unanimous rule, increasing
the number of women does not help women.17
Figure 2 explores the final expectation from the gen-
der role hypothesis: that women do best in all-female
discussions, away from the forces that produce gender
inequality, whereas men do not benefit from being in
all-male groups.We useTalk Time,men’s and women’s
average talk time in the group, because it allows us
to examine the gender-homogeneous groups.18 Consis-
tent with this expectation, female participants do tend
to talk longerwhen surroundedonly by otherwomen.19
The average woman talks more in enclaves than in the
pooled majority-female groups (significant at p < .04
in a one-tailed, group-level test and at p< .01 in a one-
tailed test with individual-level data). This test is not
significant for men.20 Enclaves seem to provide some
benefit to women but not to men, as the gender role
hypothesis predicts.
RESULTS II: PERCEIVED INFLUENCE
As we argued in the introduction, speech participation
matters because it may contribute to authority, specifi-
cally perceived influence. We measured Influence after
discussion by asking each groupmember to indicate the
16 The result holds if we expand beyond tokens to two-male and
two-female groups (supplemental Online Appendix, Table A3).
17 These results also allow us to counter claims that token men and
women are similarly disadvantaged or that men aremore negatively
affected than women by numerical minority status.
18 The talk time of the group and our conditions are unrelated.
19 This finding also argues against the alternative that gender homo-
geneity spuriously represents preference homogeneity; preference
homogeneity would produce shorter rather than longer talk times.
20 There is no conditional effect of rule on either men or women;
none was expected.
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TABLE 4. Effects of Gender and Decision Rule on Token Speech Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables
Proportion Talk
Majority Rule
Only
Proportion Talk
Unanimous
Rule Only
Proportion Talk
Both Rules
Proportion Talk
Both Rules
Female −0.075∗∗ −0.116∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.082∗
(0.035) (0.062) (0.037) (0.054)
Unanimous 0.091∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(0.037) (0.054)
Unanimous∗Female −0.029
(0.074)
Constant 0.206∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.055) (0.037) (0.042)
Observations 17 18 35 35
R-squared 0.550 0.217 0.330 0.334
Control for outlier Yes N/A Yes Yes
Control for experimental
location
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1; one-tailed test.
FIGURE 2. Mean Talk Time for Men and Women by Experimental Condition
one person who was “most influential” in the group’s
discussion and decisions.21 We tallied the number of
votes each individual received, a measure that runs
from 0 to 4.
Figure 3 shows the effects of deliberative participa-
tion on Influence. The lines for men and women only
extend as far as the maximum value of Proportion Talk
found in the data for each gender. The figures derive
21 Self-votes are eliminated. Results are essentially identical if own
votes are included.
from the model whose coefficients are provided with
Figure 3.22 The unit of analysis is the individual, with
cluster-robust standard errors. We include controls
for pre-deliberation confidence in one’s own speak-
ing ability (see the supplemental Online Appendix
for wording) and whether or not the individual’s pre-
deliberation preferences matched the group’s eventual
22 We employ a negative binomial regression for Influence because
the dependent variable skews toward 0. Just over 60% of the sample,
and nearly 70% of women, received 0 votes. Predicted probabilities
are constrained at the limit of possible votes.
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FIGURE 3. Proportion Talk’s Effect on
Perceived Influence
Note: The figure represents the predicted values generated
from a negative binomial regression, with predicted values con-
strained at the limit of possible votes. The results are as follows:
Influence (0–4) = −1.86 + 5.80 (Proportion Talk, SE = 0.49) +
0.33 (Pre-deliberation speaking confidence, SE = 0.24) + .40
(Pre-deliberation preference matched group outcome, SE =
0.11) – 0.17 (Female, SE = 0.11) – 0.17 (Experimental Site,
SE = 0.06) – 0.10 (Outlier, SE = 0.05). N = 470. Log Pseu-
dolikelihood = −515.49. Cluster-robust standard errors. Own
votes are excluded from the dependent variable.
decision as controls on individual gender. The results
are similar without these controls or when additional
demographic controls are added, including income and
party preference.23 Participants who held the floor for
a greater percentage of the group’s deliberation were
more likely to be seen as influential by the other mem-
bers of the group. Thus the active use of voice translates
into greater perceived influence, as we expected.
Because speech is related to authority, our interac-
tion hypothesis expects that authority is also directly
affected by the interaction of women’s numbers and
the decision rule. Figure 4 illustrates the large mag-
nitude of the gender gap and the predicted interac-
tive effect of the decision rule and composition on
perceived Influence.24 In Table 5, we test our inter-
action hypothesis using the same group-level OLS
models we used to test the Gender Gap in Speech
Participation, this time with the Gender Gap in Influ-
ence as the dependent variable (the average number of
influence votes in the group for menminus the average
number of votes in the group for women, scaled −4 to
4). Model 1 tests our hypothesized interaction effect,
andModel 2 adds controls for alternative explanations.
23 The patterns are the same if the dependent variable is self-rated
efficacy (supplemental Online Appendix, Table A4).
24 See supplemental Online Appendix, Figure A2, for the average
influence votes of men and women in each condition.
FIGURE 4. Gender Gap in Influence by
Experimental Condition
The results offer evidence that the gap in influence nar-
rows as the number of women increases undermajority
rule, in line with both our hypothesis and the gender
role hypothesis, but expands significantly in groupswith
more women under unanimous rule. Controls for alter-
native explanations do not alter the findings. Together,
these results offer strong validation for our interaction
hypothesis.
To better illustrate the magnitude of the interactive
effect, consider who wins the influence vote count:
When women are the majority, a woman is much more
likely to win undermajority rule (73%) than unanimity
(53%); as the minority, women win more often under
unanimous (25%) than majority rule (13%).25 In ma-
jority groups, no token woman ever wins. Influence
within the group is thus structured by the interaction
of gender composition and decision rule, as the inter-
action hypothesis predicts: The same conditions that
create disproportionate silence by women also create
disproportionate authority for men.
Model 3 also tests whether speaking behavior me-
diates the effect of the conditions on influence, as we
expect. Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest that a test of
mediation should include threemodels: one that shows
a relationship between the conditions and the Gen-
der Gap in Speech Participation, another that shows
a relationship between the conditions and the Gender
Gap in Influence, and a third that shows a smaller or
nonexistent relationship between the conditions and
the Gender Gap in Influence when the Gender Gap in
Speech Participation is included in the model. Model
3 in Table 5 shows that the interaction in Models 1
and 2 disappears once the Gender Gap in Speech
25 Winning is defined as receiving the highest number of votes in the
group, ties included.
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TABLE 5. Determinants of Gender Gap in Influence
(1) (2) (3)
Variables
Gender Gap in
Influence (Interaction)
Gender Gap in
Influence (Interaction+
Controls)
Gender Gap in
Influence with Control
for Gender Gap in
Speech Participation
Unanimous −1.141∗ −1.095∗ −0.044
(0.732) (0.768) (0.661)
Number of Women −0.364∗∗ −0.330∗ −0.054
(0.195) (0.219) (0.187)
Unanimous∗Number of Women 0.621∗∗ 0.590∗∗ 0.170
(0.267) (0.282) (0.244)
# of Egalitarians −0.003 −0.066
(0.170) (0.140)
# Favoring Maximum Redistribution −0.076 −0.143
(0.257) (0.211)
# Favoring No Redistribution 0.122 0.157
(0.237) (0.194)
Gender Gap in Speech 5.531∗∗∗
Participation (1.050)
Constant 1.586∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗ 0.497
(0.572) (0.674) (0.581)
Observations 64 64 64
R-squared 0.146 0.153 0.441
Control for outlier Yes Yes Yes
Control for experimental location Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗ p < 0.1; one-tailed test.
TABLE 6. Results of Mediation Analysis
Sobel Test
Imai, Keele, and
Tingley Test of
Mediation
Indirect effect 0.37∗∗ Average causal mediation effect 1.49∗∗
Direct effect 0.25 Direct effect 1.02
Total effect 0.62 Total effect 2.51
Proportion of total effect that is mediated 0.59 Proportion of total effect that is mediated 0.59
Ratio of indirect to direct effect 1.47 Ratio of indirect to direct effect 1.46
Note: The analysis shows how much of the effect of the interaction between gender composition and decision rule
(Unanimous∗Number of Women) on the Gender Gap in Influence is mediated by the Gender Gap in Speech Participation.
Analyses are group-level; in addition to the interaction term, models include main effects for group gender composition and for
decision rule; controls are for outlier group and experimental location. Asterisks indicate a statistically significant mediation effect.
∗∗ p < 0.05.
Participation is included. Thus, the effect of the condi-
tions on influence is mediated by speech participation.
We employ the formal test of mediation of Imai,
Keele, and Tingley (2010). Table 6 shows that a sig-
nificant percentage of the effect of our interacted ex-
perimental conditions on the Gender Gap in Influence
– 59% – is mediated by the Gender Gap in Speech
Participation.26 A Sobel test yields similar results. To-
gether, the regressions and mediation tests show that
26 The results are a partial estimate because Imai, Keele, and
Tingley (2010) have not yet extended their method to include the
interaction+main effect when the model includes an interaction be-
tween experimental conditions. For the same reason we cannot run a
sensitivity analysis of the mediation using their method; correspon-
speech matters: It affects influence. Conditions that in-
crease speech increase influence and thus authority,
and they do so in interaction, as the interaction hy-
pothesis predicts.
SUMMARY
Our analyses provide mixed support for the gender
role hypothesis. Our first supportive finding is that
dence with these authors tells us that this test is not yet extended
to interactions between experimental treatments (e-mail Dustin
Tingley, 12/15/11).
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women are often disadvantaged in speech participa-
tion, whereas men are never disadvantaged. Second,
women participate less than their equal share when
they are a minority and at equal rates when in a large
majority (at least under majority rule). Third, women
tend to do best in homogeneous groups. Fourth, fe-
male tokens participate less than male tokens. Fifth,
women’s influence gap shrinks as their numbers grow
(under majority rule).
However, contrary to the gender role hypothesis,
in unanimous groups, women are not disadvantaged
in voice or authority when in the minority, and una-
nimity substantially boosts the speech participation of
minority women, relative to majority rule. Finally, and
most troublesome for the gender role hypothesis, under
unanimous rule, the gender gap in voice and authority
is biggest when women are a majority, not a minority.
The interaction of decision rule and group gender
composition best explains this pattern of results. The
gender role hypothesis is largely correct under major-
ity rule, but is largely incorrect under unanimous rule.
Unanimous rule protects minority women, and under
this decision rule they take up their equal share of the
conversation, but it is a double-edged sword because it
also protects minority men. Minority women leverage
unanimous rule to reach equality, whereas minority
men leverage it to exceed equality. Rule protects or
hinders numerical minorities depending on who these
minorities are. These conclusions about rule would not
be possible without interacting it with gender compo-
sition.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
AND CAVEATS
Our results allow us to address several alternative ex-
planations. First, one might argue that low talk time is
not a problem if it is caused by efficiency—if it occurs
when there is no need to repeat what others already
said because one is in the preference majority. In re-
sponse, we showed that women speak less than men
whether their preference is widely shared or not. In
addition, if women are silent because they are the pref-
erence majority, that does not explain the interactive
effects.27 Thus, less voice is an indicator of less influ-
ence, not the product of a desire to avoid redundancy
with preference allies. Second, the controls reassure
us that the differences between women and men are
not due to a correlated difference in attitudes about
redistribution, but to the divergent responses of men
and women to the interaction taking place. Finally, al-
though randomly distributed chattiness may partially
explain why some people talk more than others, it does
not explain the gender gap or why it changes as it does.
There are likely considerable differences among men
and among women, but there is also a difference be-
tween the sexes. The effects really are due to gender.
27 Furthermore, if women talk less when the group has homogeneous
preferences, and gender simply stands in for preference, that does
not explain why women talk most in all-female groups.
We offer caveats about the results. Our study fea-
tured a small group size not uncharacteristic in real-
world deliberations (e.g., Esterling, Fung, and Lee
2009), but worth further study as a possible effect mod-
erator. The mitigating influence of discussion moder-
ators also merits investigation (Humphreys, Masters,
and Sandbu 2006), although moderators often focus
more on airing various views than on assuring equal
floor time and an opportunity to influence for disad-
vantaged populations, and they tend not to focus at all
on gender (Mansbridge et al. 2006).28 Our study was
conducted with non-Hispanic whites since the effects
may differ for other populations; this too can be tested
in future work.29
Although our study was conducted under controlled
circumstances, its high internal validity is valuable de-
spite the tradeoff with external validity (McDermott
2011). We further note that the task resembled the
task in many deliberative settings—people made deci-
sions about the distribution of resources to themselves
and to others in society. Although these decisions were
nonbinding outside of the experimental setting, so are
the recommendations ofmany actual citizens’ delibera-
tive bodies. In addition, although we assembled people
unfamiliar with each other to avoid the confounding
effects from familiarity, so domany real-world settings.
These settings include juries; civic deliberations (e.g.,
rebuilding the World Trade Center, or town planning)
(Fung 2003); government-organized meetings such as
on the siting of hazardous materials; and local boards
and commissions, which tend to meet infrequently and
have high turnover (Crowder-Meyer 2010). As Jacobs,
Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) found, meeting atten-
dees are highly unlikely to know each other (72). Our
experimental setting thus shares important similari-
ties with many groups of citizens who deliberate on
issues of importance to their communities all across
the United States.30
CONCLUSION
Advocates of deliberative democracy posit equal par-
ticipation as a necessary requirement of deliberation.
Our results show how far actual deliberation deviates
28 In addition, many committees, juries, or other small-group meet-
ings lack a trained moderator.
29 It is also possible that amore stereotypically feminine topic such as
child care would reduce, eliminate, or reverse the inequality and that
a more stereotypically masculine topic such as financial regulation
would increase it. In addition, we also do not know what dynamics
would occur in a balanced group.
30 Deliberative civic forums may differ from other settings and from
our study by using procedures that select on and enhance partic-
ipants’ prosocial motivations, sense of responsibility to attend to
the task, and respectful interaction; in addition, these forums may
not be instructed to reach a collective decision or may be strongly
moderated specifically for equal participation. However, our study
contained similar selection mechanisms and contextual cues, such as
instructions to choose themost just principle that cue prosocial moti-
vations. Lab experiments are noted for implicitly cueing the desire to
be a good study participant, similar to the forums’ cues to be a good
forum participant. Many settings such as committees, commissions,
juries, and civic groups do entail some collective decision, even if only
on what questions to pose, and even if the decision is nonbinding.
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from that ideal standard: In our study, women speak
substantially less than men in most mixed-gender com-
binations. Further, speech is a crucial form of partici-
pation that substantially shapes perceptions of author-
ity. As critics of deliberation contend, deliberation can
produce inequalities of participation that affect delib-
erators’ influence.
Unequal time used, not merely unequal speaking
opportunities given, is problematic for democratic de-
liberation especially when it is associated with lower
authority. Even if men and women enter deliberation
with the same preferences and equal formal rights, the
disproportionate exercise of these rights bymen erodes
the political and civic standing of women, a group not
yet equal in society.
But these inequalities must be understood in light
of the gender context and institutional rules within
which men and women deliberate because the effect
of gender is contingent on the structure of the group
setting. This finding has direct implications for the de-
bate among political theorists about whether deliber-
ation is a positive force for democracy and its precept
of equality or instead undermines the voices of sub-
ordinate group members. We suggest that a way to
resolve this debate is to focus on the conditions that
give rise to one or the other. Both views have em-
pirical support—but are contingent on circumstances.
The fact that gender inequality disappears under some
conditions means that deliberation can in fact meet the
standard of equality, as its advocates contend.
Our results have practical implications for design-
ing policy to enhance democratic participation.31 It is
possible to produce equal voice in citizen deliberation
by adopting specific decision rules and assigning delib-
erators to particular gender compositions. Many gov-
ernment and nongovernmental organizations that run
discussions can do so because they control the condi-
tions of deliberation. The results provide some simple
guidelines for promoting gender equality of participa-
tion and influence. When women are outnumbered by
men, use unanimous rule; when women are a large ma-
jority, decide by majority rule. To avoid the maximum
inequality, avoid groups with few women and majority
rule. To minimize male advantage, assemble groups
with a supermajority of women and use majority rule.
Tomaximizewomen’s individual participation, gender-
homogeneous groups are best.
More generally, our study yields substantively impor-
tant results. Perhaps most importantly, it shows that
political science has something unique to add to the
study of gender relations: the notion that the institu-
tional rules under which men and women participate
in collective decision making have a significant effect
31 Government units at the local, state, and federal levels are in-
creasingly turning to group discussions for input into policy making
or for conflict resolution, and many citizens actually participate in
these deliberations when invited to do so (Neblo et al. 2010). Small
group discussions are also common in civic life in voluntary organi-
zations, workplaces, and educational settings (Cramer Walsh 2007;
Fung 2007; Jacobs, Cook, andDelli Carpini 2009; Macedo et al. 2005;
Merelman, Streich, and Martin 1998; Ryfe 2005).
on gender dynamics. Studies of women’s representa-
tion in legislatures recognize the importance of insti-
tutional rules and norms (Carroll 2001; Grunenfelder
and Baechtiger 2007). Our results suggest that rules
and norms also shape interactions among citizens.
This study also reinforces the notion in several re-
cent studies of political behavior that gender effects
are contingent on the environment. Burns, Schlozman,
and Verba (2001), for example, found that the gender
composition of the political environment—the density
of women running for high-visibility office or the gen-
der composition of civic groups—can increase women’s
level of political information, interest, efficacy, and par-
ticipation (see also Crowder-Meyer 2010). This find-
ing implies a conceptual distinction between individual
gender versus gender composition and other gendered
aspects of the setting (see Sapiro 2003). Studies of po-
litical behavior or of political decision making may not
capture all that gender does if they only account for
individual-level gender and omit gender composition
and gendered interaction. For example, Hickerson and
Gastil’s (2008) study of deliberation found no differ-
ences between men and women and “calls into ques-
tion” the concern over social difference and equality.
Our study supports the concern about equality in part
because it analyzes gender not only as a difference
between men and women but also as a characteristic of
the environment.
Yet although the results are in linewith some existing
hypotheses about gender composition or institutional
rules, our chief result goes beyond the existing research.
The interdependent effects of gender composition and
decision rule in small group interaction have not been
a focus of any literature. We find that these effects
matter for both men and women, and for the ability
of democratic institutions to reach normative goals of
equality.
Finally, our results have implications for the de-
bate over substantive versus descriptive representa-
tion. AsMansbridge (1999) notes, “In theory, delibera-
tion seems to require only a single representative, or a
‘threshold’ presence, in the deliberation to contribute
to the larger understanding.. . . [I]n practice, however,
disadvantaged groups often need the full representa-
tion that proportionality allows in order to achieve
several goals: deliberative synergy, critical mass, dis-
persion of influence, and a range of views within the
group” (636).We argue that the same logic applies to
the volume of voice. Mansbridge is correct that “get-
ting the relevant facts, insights, and perspectives into
the deliberation” is not enough for substantive repre-
sentation; it is also necessary that many members of
the disadvantaged group air those facts, insights, and
perspectives and that they do so more than once. The
conditions that promote this process are worthy of con-
tinuing investigation.
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